Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey Environmental Laws? by Humbach, John A
Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 6, Number 3 2011 Article 17
Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey
Environmental Laws?
John A. Humbach∗
∗
Copyright c©2011 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr
SHOULD TAXPAYERS PAY PEOPLE TO OBEY
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS?
JOHN A. HUMBACH*
W e have been hearing a lot lately about the so-called "property
rights" issue-about a number of bills in Congress' and in state
legislatures,' about the literally hundreds of new cases in the courts,'
and about people rising up to demand protection from laws that im-
pinge on property rights. Actually, by definition, laws cannot "im-
pinge" on property rights. At least laws cannot impinge on legal
property rights. After all, legal property rights are whatever the law
says they are, no more, no less, and the law can be changed.
What we are witnessing, however, is a debate about what property
rights ought to be, or, as viewed from the other direction, a debate
about what ought to be the American land ethic for the twenty-first
century.' We are in the midst of a transition, a transition about how
we, as Americans, view the future of our national land.
On one side of this transition is a highly motivated property rights
movement. These defenders of private property rights are people
who are typically energized by an understandable desire to protect
their own economic interests-larger landowners, mining interests,
forest owners, real estate dealers and speculators, and the like. But
their claim is founded on a deeply rooted idea, an idea of basic fair-
ness: "what's mine is mine." As such, these claims have a powerful
pull on the American psyche. People identify with such claims and
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respond to them, and when they come wrapped in a philosophical
garb of free markets and suspicion of government generally, these
claims can be very potent indeed.
On the other side of the debate are people who have a less obvious
personal interest, or at least a non-economic interest, in the issue.
These are people who believe that, to have a high quality of life,
human beings need decent and pleasant surroundings in which to
live-people who believe that laws like the Clean Water Act5 and the
Endangered Species Act 6 address serious environmental concerns.
These are people who recognize that we all have a stake in our shared
national landbase-that the land Americans walk today is the same
land Americans will have to walk for generations to come. In short,
these are people who believe that, as a matter of basic patriotism, we
need to ensure that landowners treat this country like they care
whether there is a country here fifty years from now, or a hundred
years from now, as a decent, vital, economically viable, and beautiful
place for people to live.
The reality is that most people relate to both sides of this debate to
a greater or lesser degree. Of course private property rights are im-
portant. There is no issue about that. For most Americans, however,
private property rights are not the only thing that is important. For
most people, there are many other values that are also important: de-
cent surroundings in which to live and raise a family; clean, whole-
some waters in our rivers and reservoirs; good air to breathe; a
healthy environment for all of God's creatures; and a beautiful coun-
try for ourselves and for our children for generations to come.
In fact, the very reason we have our rather considerable body of
environmental law is because there are these other values, in addition
to property-right values, that are also important to so many people.
The other reason for so much of our existing environmental statutory
law is that the common law of nuisance has proved itself, over and
over again, to be totally inadequate to give the people and communi-
ties of our nation the environmental protection that rightfully belongs
to them.7 For example, the common law of nuisance simply does not
prohibit the polluting of water bodies or the pollution of the air unless
certain thresholds are met.8 Typically, individual polluters do not
meet the threshold even though, cumulatively, their contaminants de-
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1993).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7. See, e.g., Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) (noise, fumes,
bright lights); Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (App. Div. 1932)
(refusal to enjoin operation of heavily polluting coke plant erected across street from
plaintiff's home).
8. Id See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 826-31. See also Jeff
L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54
ALB. L. REv. 189, 212-36 (1990).
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grade or destroy major waterbodies or pollute the air to seriously un-
healthy levels.9
The fundamental problem, however, is that across our nation, there
are literally millions of acres of important natural resource lands-
shore lands, dunes, wetlands, reservoir watersheds, endangered spe-
cies habitats-that have relatively little commercial value in their
present natural condition. Yet, many owners are understandably
tempted to supplant and destroy the long-term natural resource values
of these lands to reap a return in their own lifetimes.
People often talk about buying such lands and, indeed, some gov-
ernment purchases to protect these lands are possible. Nevertheless,
we must face the fact that government purchases are simply not a fea-
sible way to protect the millions of acres of our nation's lands that are
threatened by poorly conceived development or improperly executed
utilization. Overall, for these millions of acres, only two practical
choices exist. Either we can adopt land use laws that will protect and
defend these lands, our nation's one and only national landbase, from
shortsighted modifications; or, we can surrender the fate of our na-
tional land, and the quality of the lives of our descendants, to the self-
interested decisions of a relative few.
Thus far, the choice that we have made is to not leave the future of
America's land and natural resources to the relative handful of people
who happen to be the current owners in our generation. America is a
republic and, as such, its destiny belongs first and foremost to the peo-
ple as a whole, not to some narrow class of large landowners as it was
in, for example, the England from which we rebelled. Our present
body of environmental law represents our nation's democracy-driven
choice that some land uses are just too socially intolerable to allow.
Even the self-appointed "defenders" of property rights seldom
overtly deny that our nation's environmental laws serve important
purposes. The issue, as usually phrased, is different. The issue is
framed as whether the government should compensate people for the
burdens of complying with these laws. In other words, should our na-
tion's taxpayers, you and I, have to pay people not to do things that
the national legislature has determined to be bad for other people,
bad for the community, or bad for the nation as a whole?
Should taxpayers have to pay people not to put pollutants into
streams and reservoirs? Should taxpayers have to pay people not to
kill off entire species? Should taxpayers have to reach into their pock-
ets and pay people not to disperse development seamlessly across the
countryside, relentlessly consuming, fragmenting, and degrading our
nation's remaining natural lands until almost all is gone? Should we,
9. For a more detailed discussion, see John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of
Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 CoLuM. J. ErvTL. L. 1, 17-22 (1993).
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in short, have to pay people not to engage in land-uses that have been
determined to be too socially unacceptable to allow?
The property rights advocates say this is all a fairly simple matter.
To them, it is a simple matter of the Takings Clause of the Constitu-
tion. Now, the Takings Clause, itself, is simple: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."'" The
original intent of this language was also simple. The Framers of the
Constitution intended that the Takings Clause only apply to physical
takings, not to mere regulations on the use of land.'1 To be sure, 130
years after the Constitution's Bill of Rights' 2 was adopted, the import
of the Takings Clause was extended to encompass not just physical
takings but also certain extreme forms of land-use regulation. The
1922 case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 prompted this un-
abashed burst of judicial activism, and has remained a favorite of the
property rights defenders.
It is striking to me that Pennsylvania Coal has become such a favor-
ite of people who, supposedly, favor property rights protection. Penn-
sylvania Coal is not really a property rights protection case at all.
Instead, it is a case that stands for a very different proposition,
namely, that some people's property deserves more protection than
other people's property. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court
struck down a state statute enacted to protect people's homes from
being destroyed due to the undermining activities of the coal compa-
nies that owned the coal under the homes.'4
The Supreme Court decided to favor the coal company's property
rights over the homeowner's, reasoning: "[tjhis is the case of a single
private house,"15 and "a source of damage to such a house is not a
public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in differ-
10. U.S. CONST. amend V.
11. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15 (1992).
See also Scott M. Reznick, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Early
19th Century America, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 854 (1973) (reviewing the cases in which,
absent physical invasion, no compensation was required); William M. Treanor, Note,
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) (reviewing evidence of the intentions of
James Madison and his contemporaries).
During the nineteenth century, the "immense weight of authority" held that there
was no requirement of compensation under the Takings Clause unless the governmen-
tal act consisted of a "physical invasion of the real estate." Gibson v. United States,
166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897) (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1878)).
12. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. The Takings Clause is contained in the Fifth
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.
13. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (striking down a law to prohibit coal companies from ex-
tracting certain coal that formed the subjacent support for various kinds of surface
structures and improvements).
14. Id. at 414.
15. Id. at 413.
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ent places."'" After considering the respective property interests in-
volved, the Court concluded: "[t]he statute does not disclose public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the [coal
company's] constitutionally protected rights. 17 In short, when mere
homeowners' interests in protecting their homes collided with a coal
company's interests in utilizing its property rights, the homeowners'
rights carried so little "public interest" that they (and the laws that
protected them) had to yield. To understand what the so-called
"property rights" movement is really all about, re-read Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.
However, despite the judicial activism of Pennsylvania Coal, laws
are not unconstitutional merely because they may have the incidental
effect of diminishing the value of land. As the Supreme Court deter-
mined in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'8 it is "a reality we
nowadays acknowledge explicitly" that "government may ... affect
property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to com-
pensate." And the reason is obvious: otherwise "government hardly
could go on."' 9 Nearly everything the government does has the po-
tential to raise or lower property values. The Federal Reserve raises
the discount rate, and bond values drop. The government deregulates
the airlines, and some of them go bankrupt. It deregulates the savings
and loans, and the private economic impacts are even worse. A state
enacts stiffer Driving-While-Intoxicated laws, and marginal saloons go
broke.
Yet, by the same token, when the government builds a new inter-
state highway or underwrites flood insurance, the effect may be to
raise property values. Again, to quote Justice Scalia, "[t]he fact is that
virtually all [economic] regulation benefits some segments of the soci-
ety and harms others. 20 However, this fact does not make such laws
invalid.
Consider, for example, Mr. Lucas himself. Lucas owned two beach-
front lots that he claimed to be worth $1 million.2' He asserted that
the government took all of the economic value of his property by for-
bidding him to build on those lots.' Lucas brought suit and was
awarded nearly $1.5 million of taxpayers' hard-earned money.23 Con-
sider, however, why Lucas's two lots had a fair market value of $1
million.
16. Id
17. Id at 414.
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
19. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
20. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 377 (1991) (up-
holding a billboard regulation with preferential effects against an antitrust challenge).
21. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
22. Id
23. Id. at 2890.
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It turns out that Mr. Lucas's two lots had a value of $1 million for
one key reason-because the federal government runs a program to
underwrite flood insurance for shorefront property, which is especially
vulnerable to hurricanes and other big storms. Without such flood
insurance there would be no mortgages because banks do not lend
money for beach houses unless they are properly insured. Without
mortgages there would be no buyers. Without buyers there would not
be a $1 million land value because, as a matter of simple economics,
fair market value depends on there being demand for the property.
As for the flood insurance that is the key to it all, there is, of course,
only one insurer around who is gullible enough to back up the risks
involved: that is us, the American taxpayers. It is the federal govern-
ment's flood insurance program that makes possible reasonable cost
insurance for these houses.
Therefore, the government made possible the insurance, which
made possible the mortgages, which made possible the buyers, which
gave the two Lucas lots their $1 million value. Without the insurance,
they would have been worth what beaches have always been worth-
perhaps as little as the value of the sand.
When the government's actions create a high value for beachfront
property, everybody seems to like that. What if, however, the govern-
ment's actions happen to reduce the very same values that govern-
ment actions have created. Should the taxpayers have to pay the
amount of the reduction, as they did in Lucas? It does not seem fair
that they should. Thus, the real question here is whether taxpayers
should have to pay to prevent socially undesirable uses of land, even
when the Constitution does not require it, and even when, for the last
200 years, the law has not required it?
The concept here seems to be that we have two kinds of laws in this
country. First, there is the kind of law that people are supposed to
obey. Then, there is the other kind of law, the kind of law that certain
people should not have to obey-unless they get paid.
Laws against using your property as a pornography shop or to grow
marijuana are good examples of the first kind of law. Nobody expects
to get paid to obey that kind of law. When there is a law against filling
a wetland, or a law against destroying some of our nation's prime agri-
cultural lands, these laws would fall into the second category. Not
long ago, an outfit called Whitney Benefits received a $60 million
judgment, payable out of taxpayer dollars, as its reward for complying
with a law of the latter type.24
Now, most of us are willing to obey the law for free. We do not ask
to be paid, even when the law in question happens to be based on
values we do not necessarily agree with. For decades, most urban
24. Whitney Benefits v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 952 (1991).
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property owners have accepted and lived with the proposition that
you cannot necessarily change the use of your land just because you
can make a profit doing it. This is a principal effect for the vast major-
ity of American landowners (homeowners) of ordinary local zoning
laws: if you own a single family house and lot, you cannot tear it down
and replace it with condos, or a little grocery store, or a medical arts
building, just because you could make money doing it. People have
accepted this for decades.
Here, then, is a basic difference between the so-called defenders of
property rights and the rest of us. They want to get paid for the incon-
venience of obeying the law of the land, at least when it comes to laws
that are aimed at protecting the land itself.
Why do some people think they should be paid to obey our nation's
environmental laws? In fact, I think their reasons are understanda-
ble-not right, but understandable. There are many good and decent
people who just honestly do not think there is anything wrong with
doing the kinds of things environmental laws prohibit. You have to
remember, it is not long ago that wetlands were "marshes and
swamps," noxious places that people wanted to drain and fill. Wild
animals were just in the way. A lot of old historic buildings in your
town represented the opposite of "progress." Beaches and flood
plains were ideal places to build a house, and farms and forests were
often seen as holding areas until somebody came along to put the land
to productive use.
Knowledge and widely held values have evolved, but there are still
many good and decent people who just do not take seriously environ-
mental harms that other good and decent people take very seriously.
Many people simply do not believe that destroying wetlands is a bad
thing to do, or that killing off entire species is a serious affair. Many
people simply do not believe there is anything wrong with building on
beaches and dunes or in flood plains, or that the gradual death-by-a-
thousand-cuts of a whole water body really justifies saying to any one
watershed owner: "you can't take your nick; we're drawing the line
here."
That is what the so-called property rights debate is really all about.
It is not a disagreement about property rights, as such. It is a disa-
greement about values, and to some degree scientific knowledge asso-
ciated with a handful of questionable land-uses. This problem exists
because, as I mentioned earlier, we are in a transition, a transition
about how we as Americans view the future of our national land. The
question is, what do you do when you are in a transition? What do
you do when you have a country with 260 million people, a depleting
natural resource base, and many, many different views and different
values about what is important and what should be a priority. It is a
question of "who decides?" Who decides some of the most difficult
and controvertible questions of our time?
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I do not think there is an easy answer here, and anybody who has an
easy answer (such as, "let the landowners decide for us all") is pretty
likely wrong. Nevertheless, here is my answer-well, my answer and
the Supreme Court's.
For me and the U.S. Supreme Court, it is the fundamental premise
of democracy that when different people have varying values on issues
like protecting the national land, it has to be the values of the major-
ity, as represented in the elected legislature, that get reflected in the
law. 5 The dissidents do not have a right to payment for obeying the
law just because they dissent, even if they happen to think that the law
in question makes no sense. There is nothing in the Constitution that
limits the legislative majority's rights in this regard (except, of course,
if there is a physical taking of property or its functional equivalent, a
total diminution of value).26
So, what is the big deal here? If our elected Congress wants to ex-
tend compensation beyond what the Constitution requires, who can
object? After all, fifty-one percent of the voters in this country voted
for the present congressional majority in the contested elections last
fall. True, fifty-one percent is not an overwhelming majority, but a
majority is a majority. If the majority wants to extend owners' rights
to compensation beyond what the Constitution requires, who can
object?
One possible objection, perhaps, is that paying landowners to obey
the law of the land would totally disrupt the difficult balance between
private rights and public protection that is enshrined in our Constitu-
tion, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. But, so what if a new com-
pensation scheme disrupts the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. If that is where the majority's values fall, should it not
be the law?
For me, the real objection here is something different. The real ob-
jection is that this property rights legislation looks a lot like a decep-
tion. It looks like a deceptive attempt to do something the majority
does not want. It is a sneak attack on our nation's environmental
laws.
The proponents of this new compensation legislation should come
right out and call it the "Environmental Rights Abolition Act of
1995," because that is what it is. Rights are just the correlatives of
25. "Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere
.... Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the govern-
ment." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887). And "in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the inter-
ests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interest." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
26. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892-95.
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duties; one person's duty is another person's right.27 Hence, whenever
you abolish somebody's duties, or make them too costly to enforce,
the effect is to abolish somebody else's rights.
We know the reason why the proponents do not forthrightly call
their legislation the "Environmental Rights Abolition Act of 1995."
They do not do so because then it would not sell. Polls indicate that
the vast majority of Americans support our nation's environmental
laws and do not think those laws go too far.2" That does not, however,
mean that there is any real issue about property rights. Just about
everybody recognizes that our system of private property is essential
to our enjoying a level of material well-being that is unsurpassed in
history. Just about everybody also agrees, however, that there are
some uses of property that are simply too intolerable to allow. Maybe
it is using your land to grow marijuana. Maybe it is running an unsani-
tary tenement house. Maybe it is an adult magazine store next to a
junior high school (my guess, a very profitable use of real estate). Or
maybe it is a junkyard or waste transfer station right in the middle of a
residential neighborhood. Whatever your favorite anti-social use of
land might be, the point is that just about everybody agrees that there
are some uses of property that are too unacceptable to allow, and that
the taxpayers should not have to pay people not to make those uses.
In summary, the real dispute is not about property rights. It is a
dispute about a handful of questionable land-uses. Some people hon-
estly believe that these land-uses are not too socially intolerable to
allow, while others think they are too socially intolerable to allow.
These are uses such as filling wetlands or wrecking historic buildings,
or building houses on beaches and dunes-uses as to which there are
differences in understandings and differences in the values that people
hold.
When you get down to it, to focus on property rights, as such, is
really a distraction, a device to turn our eyes from what is really at
stake. The real question is not about property rights. The real ques-
tion is, what right does our nation have to protect itself from the
shortsighted destruction of its national land? What right does a nation
have to protect the land on which the quality of its citizens' lives de-
pends? I say our nation has plenty of right. For even though private
property rights are important, no nation can bind itself to pay off
those who, if not paid, would harm or waste its natural resources. No
nation can leave the quality of its land or of its children's lives to the
27. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 35-50 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919) (also found at 23 YALE L.J.
16 (1913)).
28. According to a recent Tume/CNN poll, for example, 88% of Americans con-
sider environmental protection to be "very important" or "one of the most impor-
tant" problems facing the country today. Dick Thompson, Congressional Chain-Saw
Massacre, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at 58.
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self-interested decisions of a relative few. No nation can give up its
right to defend its national land.
